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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic reforms are inevitable for the development of an economy like Pakistan. 
During the last two decades, Pakistan has passed through phenomenal economic changes 
and reforms. In the 1990’s, we had seen privatisation plans initiated by the government as 
a major economic reform. Similarly, to demonstrate the seriousness of the government in 
encouraging foreign investment flows in Pakistan; there has been a perceptible 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange regime. Allied to these efforts, the trade regime was 
opened up and the maximum tariff rates were cut down to 25 percent with only four slabs 
and the average tariff rate was lowered to 14 percent. The financial sector too, was 
restructured and opened up to the foreign competition. Foreign and domestic private 
banks currently operating in Pakistan have been able to increase their market share to 
more than 60 percent of assets and deposits.  
Central to the economic reforms process is a clear progression towards 
deregulation of the economy. Prices of petroleum products, gas, energy, agricultural 
commodities and other key inputs are mostly determined by market. Imports and 
domestic marketing of petroleum products have been deregulated and opened up to the 
private sector. More importantly, taxation reforms have been prominently on the 
government’s agenda, with no real reforms undertaken. This is another area where policy 
makers and business community has innumerable grievances and dissatisfaction with the 
arbitrary nature of tax administration. 
The previous military government had introduced a concept of better economic 
governance. Transparency, consistency, predictability and rule-based decision-making 
had begun to take roots. Discretionary powers were significantly curtailed. Freedom of 
press and access to information has had a salutary effect on the behaviour of decision 
makers. The other pillars of good governance are: (a) devolution of power to the local 
governments who will have the administrative and financial authority to deliver public 
services to all citizens, and (b) an accountability process which will take to task those 
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indulging in corruption through a rigorous process of detection, investigation and 
prosecution. 
During this earlier period, economic growth was mainly led by consumer goods, 
with food and pharmaceuticals showing the strongest contribution. Intermediate goods—
building materials, fertilisers, industrial chemicals, petroleum products, and other raw 
material—posted a speedy recovery. Domestic textile industry has been reshaped in 
recent years with growing scope and depth in terms of products and business strategies. 
But no matter how obvious the growth is, we unfortunately cannot measure it since the 
large part of the sector is undocumented. More disturbing is investors’ disinterest in 
textile manufacturing which calls for drastic steps to encourage them. Certainly 
pessimism regarding global demand is a major issue hurting investment prospects in 
textiles, and due to energy shortage is the most dominant factor in discouraging 
additional investments in the sector.  
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s corporate sector has yet to introduce good governance 
reforms and optimal dividend policy. The code of corporate governance has been 
introduced in Pakistan in 2002 but only 5 percent companies have adopted 
governance practices. Similarly, in case of setting up optimal and consistent dividend 
policy, only few companies have their consistent dividend policy. In developed 
economies, corporate governance and consistent dividend policy are important 
parameters for sustainable economic growth. The dividend policy is always an 
appealing topic for academics. There are several studies on this subject, but none has 
studied the role of dividend policy and corporate governance in the presence of 
economic reforms on sectoral economic growth in Pakistan. This paper tries to 
establish a link between economic reforms, dividend policy, corporate governance 
and sectoral growth in the presence of existing pitfalls of the Pakistan’s economy. 
This has not been addressed in the existing economic literature in Pakistan. This 
paper tries to fill this gap for Pakistan’s sectoral growth. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Good governance is vital for the development of a healthy and competitive 
corporate sector. A strong corporate sector boosts “sustained” and “shared” economic 
growth, i.e. growth that can withstand economic shocks and benefit all  stake holders. 
Countries can, therefore, benefit immensely from corporate governance framework as 
a tool to address factors leading to sagging economic activity. The most important 
decision, at corporate level, which emanates from corporate governance mechanism, 
is the dividend policy. The equitable distribution of economic resources through 
board of directors can be achieved in developing countries like Pakistan which 
encourages economic growth. While finance theory largely supports the irrelevance 
of dividend policy in perfect capital markets, [Modigliani and Miller (1961)]; most 
people regard payout policy as controversial. Specially, in the presence of taxes and 
transaction costs, payout policy is regarded as a puzzle. Nevertheless, most firms do 
pay dividends.  
The overall state of Pakistan’s economy is stagnant, because in recent years 
Pakistan has encountered broad economic challenges mainly because of energy crises. 
The policy-makers have not been able to implement appropriate policies, which resulted 
 Economic Reforms, Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy 51:4, 135 
 
in a sluggish GDP growth. Critical differences between Pakistan and emerging countries 
that have recently adjusted successfully through economic reforms, such as India, Chile, 
Brazil and Turkey—lies in Pakistan’s inability to grasp the seriousness of the economic 
crisis and lack of commitment to the needed policy reform i.e., poor governance. It would 
be imperative to know as to what drove other countries—notwithstanding their political 
constraints—to improve their governance and steadfastly implement difficult, but 
necessary, policy reforms and, thus, determine what Pakistan can learn from their 
experience to improve governance.  
Pablo, et al. (2008) investigate the extent of the institution with better practices of 
corporate governance is related to the economic growth in Brazil. The evidence 
suggested that companies who adopt better practices of corporate governance have better 
performances (collect more benefits) in the economic growth cycle than those companies 
that do not adopt them. Sulesa, et al. (2010) found a negative relationship between 
investment opportunity set and dividend policy is weaker for firm with larger board size 
and larger number of independent directors representing the board. Arun (2005) 
investigated the impact of good governance practices in financial institutions on the 
economic growth of a country through financial development in Bangladesh. The role of 
corporate governance was found to be significant in the performance of banking sector in 
Pakistan in both conventional and Islamic banks [Rehman, et al. (2010)].  
Burki, et al. (2007) suggested that there is an impact of corporate governance 
changes on banking efficiencies in Pakistan. Apart from the financial sector, 
Rehman, et al. (2010) explored the influence of corporate governance practices on 
return on equity in pharmaceutical sector of Pakistan. The concept of dominance of 
family business is characterised in Pakistani markets where they developed as group 
and their performance is distinguished from firms which are not under such group as 
in the case of Japan. Ramiz, et al. (2012) studied a positive and significant impact of 
board size on return on asset and return on equity in the banking sector of Pakistan. 
The explanation regarding the signalling theory given by Bhattacharya (1979) and 
Williams (1985) suggested that dividends accompany information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders by delivering inside information of firm’s future 
prospects.  
Agarwal, et al. (1996) identified a negative relationship between board 
independence and firm’s performance. The presence of institutional nominees is a unique 
feature of Indian corporate governance and there has been a powerful corporate lobby in 
favour of removing them from boards. While this would reduce the accountability of 
Indian boards even further, the reports argue that a more active approach to corporate 
governance on the part of institutional investors requires larger changes in the nature of 
the FIs’ ownership and control by government, greater autonomy for institutional 
managers, and the active development of a market for corporate control. Several other 
studies conducted in different countries showed the same relationship. Recent studies 
suggest dividends’ role as monitoring mechanism, which allows minority shareholders to 
control the managers or larger shareholders’ decisions. The development of capital 
markets is related to minority shareholders protection [Dragota (2006)]. Hence, dividend 
policy serves as a mechanism for capital market development thereby contributing to 
51:4, 136 Rehman, Hasan, Mangla, and Sultana 
 
overall economic growth. Myers’ (1984) pecking order description of the capital structure 
decision implies a link between the firm’s dividend payout and its investment 
requirements and earnings variability. Dividend payout behaviour of U.S. firms as 
observed by the researchers supported their argument [Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992); 
McCabe (1979); Rozeff (1982)].  
Although dividend payouts are a function of firm specific variables such as 
investment requirements and earnings variability, Lintner (1953) hypothesises that 
dividend policy also is influenced by an industry effect. This effect could be interpreted 
as common correlations with determinants of dividend payout by firms in the same 
industry, but Lintner suggests an effect of dividend leadership analogous to price 
leadership or wage leadership. Such an industry effect, if it exists, presumably stands 
apart from other firm-specific variables that affect payout decisions of the member firms 
within an industry and causes industries to have varying dividend policies. Some 
evidence suggests that there is significant variation in dividend payout ratios among 
industries [Baker (1988); Michel (1979)].  
 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1.  Data Collection 
Our study explores the relationship between economic reforms, dividend 
payout ratio, corporate governance and sectoral economic growth in Pakistan. The 
analysis covers a period of ten years from 1998 to 2008. This study is related to two 
major sectors of Pakistan, Large Scale Manufacturing Sector (LSM) and Financial 
Sector (FS). The reason behind selecting these two sectors is the major contribution 
of these two sectors in total GDP. The financial sector of Pakistan contributes 
approximately 52 percent of the total GDP while the Large Scale Manufacturing 
(LSM) contributes 24 percent. The sample sectors are amongst the biggest sectors in 
Pakistan. There are a large number of companies in each sector. However, we have 
included only those companies whose data are available and published by State Bank 
of Pakistan in its annual reports. The breakdown of the sample by sectors and years 
given in Table 1. The total number of observations is 3,643. The 84.30 percent 
observations belong to LSM, because LSM is the largest sector in Pakistan. But in 
recent year’s financial sector (FS) is also growing very rapidly, the contribution of 
FS observations in this sample is 15.70 percent.  
The reason for choosing this particular period is the variation and introduction 
of economic reforms in Pakistan, which are reflected in the macro-economic 
indicators. For example, in Pakistan, we have experienced a high economic growth in 
last decade (1998–2008) and afterward a sharp decline too. The data is collected 
from the annual reports of State Bank of Pakistan, and Federal Bureau of Statistic: 
Pakistan. We applied two-stage regression analysis for this study to avoid the 
possible endogenous relationship among GDP growth and sectoral economic growth. 
Since the sectoral economic growth may influence on the overall GDP growth, hence 
likely to be endogenous variable.  
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Table 1 
Sample Break Down  
By Sector 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Large Scale Manufacturing  
 Textile 1322  36.29% 
Chemical 285  7.82% 
Engineering 301  8.26% 
Sugar 240  6.59% 
Paper and Board 85  2.33% 
Cement 101  2.77% 
Fuel and Energy 190  5.22% 
Tabaco 25  0.69% 
Jute 41  1.13% 
Vanaspati and Allied Industry 38  1.04% 
Misc. Industry 443  12.16% 
Total Manufacturing 3071  84.30% 
Financial 
  Public Banks 46  1.26% 
Private Banks 175  4.80% 
Foreign Banks 58  1.59% 
Specialised Banks 44  1.21% 
Insurance Companies 78  2.14% 
Leasing Companies 17  0.47% 
Investment Banks 14  0.38% 
Modarba 49  1.35% 
Mutual Funds 30  0.82% 
DFI’s 11  0.30% 
Exchange Companies 41  1.13% 
House Finance 3  0.08% 
Venture Capital 6  0.16% 
Total Financial  572  15.70% 
Total Sample 3643  100.00% 
 
By Year 
  Year Frequency Percent 
1998  413  11.34% 
1999  412  11.31% 
2000  248  6.81% 
2001  227  6.23% 
2002  220  6.04% 
2003  210  5.76% 
2004  197  5.41% 
2005  206  5.65% 
2006  418  11.47% 
2007  539  14.80% 
2008  553  15.18% 
Total 3643  100% 
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3.2.  Two Stage Regression Model 
The variables included in this analysis are: dividend payout Ratio (DPR), sectoral 
economic growth (SG), ownership concentration (OWCEN), board Independence 
(BDIND), board size (BS), gross domestic product (GDP), interest rates (IR), and foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The dividend payout ratio (DRP) is defined as the total dividend 
paid by a company either in term of cash or stock in a given year. Sectoral economic 
growth is the growth rate of a particular sector in a given year. The interest rates (IR) are 
the annual nominal interest rates in Pakistan.  The Foreign direct investment growth is the 
annual growth rate in FDI in Pakistan.   Gross domestic product growth is the annual 
growth in country’s gross domestic product. Board independence is the proportion of 
independent directors in the board, if a proportion is greater than 0.5 then assigned a 
value 1 otherwise 0.  Board size is the number of directors in the board. Ownership 
concentration is the proportion of majority shareholders in a company, if the proportion is 
greater than 0.5 then assigned a value of 1 otherwise 0.  
 
First Stage Regression Model 
In first stage regression, GDP annual growth is regressed on lagged GDP annual 
growth rate, dividend payout ratio, annual interest rate, foreign direct investment annual 
growth rate, ownership concentration, board size and board independence. At this stage, 
we estimate GDP annual growth and use it in the second stage as an explanatory variable. 
                                                       
                                                     
 
Second Stage Regression Model 
In second stage, estimated GDP annual growth rate is used as an explanatory variable 
along with dividend payout ratio, annual interest rate, foreign direct investment, ownership 
concentration, board independence and board size to estimate sectoral economic growth.  
                                               
                                    
The expected signs are as follows: β1> 0, β2> 0, β3< 0, β4> 0, β5< 0, β6 and  > 
0, єi is the error term, where i= 1, 2, 3, є       N (0, б
2
). The models follow the assumptions 
of classical linear regression and some variations of it. The significance of this model will 
be further analysed by applying ANOVA (Analysis of Variance).  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the study. The mean GDP growth rate 
and interest rate over the period of ten years are 5.39 percent and 9.25 percent 
respectively. The trend of GDP growth over the sample period is mixed. The study period 
have three different phases in term of political, economic and global changes. Initially 
during 1998–2001, the GPD growth in Pakistan is on the declining side due to various 
geo-political changes within the country and globe. The political government was taken 
over by military commander in late 1999 which created a severe political crisis in the 
country. The impact of that political crisis was shown in the country’s economy by large. 
The situation becomes worse by 9/11 which affected the world economy very badly.   
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
SEC_GDP 20 7.80% 6.90% 6.53% 4.80% 9.30% 
GDP 10 5.39% 5.80% 1.88% 3.90% 7.20% 
INT 10 9.25% 9.50% 1.80% 7.50% 10.00% 
FDI 10 –2.60% 26.50% 80.10% –19.10% 44.80% 
DRP 3643 2.64% 0.00% 9.31% 0.00% 2.30% 
OWNCON 3643 0.92 1 0.25 1 1 
BI 3643 0.629 1 0.48 1 1 
BS 3643 8.6 8 2.6 7 11 
 
After a hopeless situation in late 1990’s and early 2000, Pakistan’ economy was 
then stabilised a bit by introducing a stable political system and more precise industrial 
and economic policies. Those positive changes were reflected in the country’s GDP, and 
in mid-2000 Pakistan had achieved its historic growth rate in GDP. The financial sector 
at that time was in boom and major contributor in total GDP. The interest rates are more 
stabilised and Pakistan was emerging as a new economy at that time.  
The last phase in late 2007 and early 2008 was also a shift of political and 
economic change in the country. Almost nine years of military regime dominated by 
Musharaf was ended in 2008.  From the very first day, the new political government in 
Pakistan faced severe economic and security concerns.  The impact of that economic 
crisis was reflected on the gross domestic product growth rate and interest rate. The GDP 
growth rate was declined again with an increase in discount rate. The following graphs 
are shown the trend of GDP growth and interest rates during the study period.  
 
Graph 1 
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Graph 2 
 
 
The mean sectoral economic growth of LSM and FS is 7.8 percent which is higher 
than the overall mean GDP growth rate but with high variation.  The mean of sectoral 
economic growth (SEG) is mostly contributed by financial sector. The SEG of large scale 
manufacturing sector (LSM) has showed a much consistent trend as compared with SEG 
of financial sector (FS) during the last decade. In few years, the sectoral economic growth 
of LSM has declined from its average sectoral economic growth of 7.68 percent. But in 
most years, the SEG of LSM was closer to its average. On the other hand, the financial 
sector (FS) has experienced it’s boom time during the last decade. Financial sector has 
started with a negative SEG in 1999 then achieved its highest SEG in mid-2000 and then 
a sharp declined in 2007. The average SEG of FS was 12.7 percent during 1998–2008.  
The comparative trends of both SEG are show in the following graph. 
 
Graph 3 
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The mean dividend payout ratio in both sectors is 2.64 percent which is not very 
high ratio, but variation in DPR is very high. The reason behind a low average of DPR is 
textile sector. But the variation in dividend payout ratio shows that the other firms in the 
sample have very high percentage of dividend. It has been considerably noticed that the 
dividend payout ratio of textile sector is very low during the last decade. The high 
dividend payout ratio in financial sector is one of the important indicator of financial 
sector growth and its contribution in total GDP. The average dividend payout ratio of 
financial sector during 1998–2008 was 11.24 percent whereas DPR of LSM was 2.3 
percent. 
 
Graph 4 
 
 
The average FDI growth rate during the study period is –2.60 percent which 
seemingly not in line with the given GDP growth rate at the same time 80.10 percent 
standard deviation is observed in FDI. The average board size in both sector’s firms is 8, 
whereas on average there is an ownership concentration in both sector firms with some 
board independence which is very unlikely. 
 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation 
Variables SEC_GDP GDP DRP FDI INT OWNCON BI BS 
SEC_GDP 1 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.06 –0.073*** –0.004 0.026 0.021 
GDP 
 
1 0.040** 0.12 –0.02*** 0.002 0.081 0.012 
DRP 
  
1 0.01* 0.05* –0.003 –0.028** –0.043** 
FDI 
   
1 0.032 0.01 0.049 0.031 
INT 
    
1 0.045 0.02 0.008 
OWNCON 
     
1 0.339*** 0.164*** 
BI 
      
1 0.57*** 
BS         1 
  * Signifinance at the level of 10 percent (One- tail test). 
** Signifinance at the level of 5 percent (One- tail test). 
*** Signifinance at the level of 1 percent (One- tail test). 
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Table 3 gives the Pearson Correlation among all variables.  The highest 
correlation is among Board Independence and Board Size (r=0.57) and it is significant 
at 1 percent level of significance. It is theoretically in line with the literature that higher 
the board size higher is the board independence. The correlation coefficients between 
ownership concentration with board size and board independence are positive and 
significant at 1 percent level of significance which is very unusual. There is a negative 
and significant relationship between dividend payout ratio and board independence 
(r=–0.028). The correlation between sectoral growth and interest rate is also negative 
and significant (r=–0.073). 
To analyse further, we run two stage-regression to find out the impact of economic 
reforms, corporate governance variables and dividend policy on sectoral economic 
growth (SEG). In first stage-regression, we estimated model 1, and then used the results 
of model 1 in second stage regression. In Table 4, first stage-regression result shows that 
the overall model is significant at 1 percent level of significance. The co-efficient of lag 
GDP growth rate is highly significant at 1 percent, which shows an impact of lagged 
GDP on GDP growth rate. The interest rate co-efficient is negatively significant at 5 
percent level of significance, showing its negative impact on the economy growth. The 
dividend payout rate has positive and significant impact on GDP growth rate. All three 
governance variable ownership concentration, board independence and board size has 
positive but non-significant impact on over all GPD growth. The adjusted R
2  
of first 
stage regression is 18 percent. 
In second stage-regression, result shows that the overall model is significant at 1 
percent level of significance.  
The GDP_E coefficient is positive and significant at 1 percent level of significance. 
This shows that growth in GDP can contribute into an individual sectoral economic 
growth of a country. The interest rate coefficient is negative and significant at 10 percent 
level of significance. It is consistent with the literature that interest rates are negatively 
associated with economic growth. High interest rates increase the cost of doing business 
for a company which results in low profits. The FDI has a positive but insignificant 
impact on sectoral economic growth.  The role of economic reforms in determining the 
sectoral economic growth is established from the results of this study. Both GDP growth 
and interest rate are the part of economic reforms and both have significant impact on 
sectoral economic growth.    
The result also shows that there is a positive and significant impact of dividend 
policy on sectoral economic growth. The companies having consistent and high dividend 
payout ratio experience high economic growth. A consistent dividend policy plays an 
important role in building confidence among investors. There is general trend in case of 
Pakistan’s capital market, investors are more willing to invest in those companies and 
sectors whose dividend payout ratio is higher than others. The results of this study also 
support this argument.  
Among three corporate governance variables, ownership concentration and board 
independence have positive and significant impact on sectoral economic growth, which is 
very unlikely for ownership concentration. There is a positive but insignificant impact of 
board size on sectoral economic growth. The adjusted R
2  
of second stage regression is 25 
percent. 
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Table 4 
Two Stage-Regression 
Variables Predicted Signs Co-efficient t-statistics P-value 
Panel A: First Stage-Regression       
Intercept ? 0.034 19.70 0.000*** 
lag_GDP + 0.410 25.37 0.000*** 
FDI + 0.160 1.60 0.150 
INT – –0.012 –3.02 0.02** 
DRP + 0.005 2.08 0.036** 
OWNCEN – 0.006 1.92 0.51 
BI + 0.001 4.31 0.23 
BS + 0.100 3.37 0.19 
N 
  
3,643 
 F-Statistics 
  
128.890 0.000*** 
Adjusted  R2 
  
18% 
 Panel B: Second Stage-Regression       
Intercept ? 0.012 1.250 0.211 
GDP_E + 1.280 8.940 0.000*** 
FDI + 0.020 1.100 0.310 
INT – –0.008 –1.840 0.064* 
DRP + 0.064 6.190 0.004*** 
OWNCEN – 0.020 4.180 0.071* 
BI + 0.032 5.190 0.016** 
BS + –0.005 –0.099 0.320 
N 
  
3,643 
 F-Statistics 
  
24.350 0.000*** 
Adjusted R2 
  
25% 
 The dependent variable in first stage-regression is GDP. The dependent in second stage-regression is 
SEC_GDP.lag_GDP is a lagged value of GDP in first stage, whereas GDP_E is the fitted value of GDP from 
first stage. 
    * Signifinance at the level of 10 percent (One- tail test). 
  ** Signifinance at the level of 5 percent (One- tail test). 
*** Signifinance at the level of 1 percent (One- tail test). 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In Pakistan, we had gone through phenomenon economic and structural 
changes during the last decade. The decade was important for Pakistan in term of 
political and economic changes in the country. That is the very reason, we have 
chosen that period for our study. The main objective of this study is to identify any 
relationship between sectoral economic growth, economic reforms, corporate 
governance and dividend policy. The study tries to establish a link between different 
but important indicators of an economy. To setup an optimal dividend policy is an 
important issue for any firm.   
The results of this study have three aspects, first, the impact of economic reforms 
on sectoral economic growth. In economic reforms variables GDP growth and interest 
rates have positive and negative impact respectively on sectoral economic growth while 
FDI has no impact. This shows low interest rates and high economic growth contribute in 
sectoral economic growth. If economy is growing then its effect will be reflected in the 
industry’s progress as well.  The second aspect of the analysis is dividend policy. 
Dividend policy has always been an important factor to study for a company’s 
performance and its growth. It has a positive impact on sectoral economic growth. The 
high dividend payout ratio leads to high growth in a respective sector. The reason behind 
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this argument is that high dividend payout ratio is always an attraction for th investors to 
invest in those companies or sector who have high dividend payout ratio. The argument is 
very well supported by our results i.e., historical figures showed that there was a very 
high dividend payout ratio in FS, on the other hand, a very low dividend payout ratio in 
LSM. In result of that, FS has contributed significantly very much in sectoral economic 
growth and overall GDP as compared to LSM.  
The last and the third part of the analysis looks at the impact of corporate 
governance practices on sector growth. The result shows that board independence has 
an important role in the progress and growth of LSM and FS. While, unlikely, our 
results suggest that ownership concentration is also an important factor for the 
growth of these sectors. The result shows an indifferent impact of board size on 
sectoral economic growth. Overall economic reforms, corporate governance and 
dividend policy are important ingredients for sectoral economic growth of Large 
Scale Manufacturing and Financial Sectors. Further studies can extend this 
phenomenon for others sectors. 
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